Measuring the Degree of Monopsony Power in the EU Fish Importing Industry: Implications for Ugandan Fresh and Chilled Fish Fillet Exports by Muhammad, Andrew
Measuring the Degree of Monopsony Power in the EU Fish Importing Industry: 





Department of Economics and Finance 
Southern University 
PO Box 9723 
Baton Rouge, LA 70813 
 
Phone: (225) 771-5640 














Selected Paper prepared for presentation at the 
Southern Agricultural Economics Association Annual Meetings 





Copyright 2005 by Andrew Muhammad. All rights reserved. Readers may make verbatim 
copies of this document for non-commercial purposes by any means, provided that this 
copyright notice appears on all such copies Measuring the Degree of Monopsony Power in the EU Fish Importing Industry: 






Although France, Belgium and the Netherlands import a significant percentage of chilled fish 
fillet from Uganda, results suggest no significant degree of monopsony power is exercised by 
these countries. If Ugandan firms export to a few countries the competitive price should still 
prevail if there are many importing firms.  
 
 
1.  Introduction 
The export of fish from Uganda has been an important source of revenue for the country. For the 
period 1998 through 2003, Uganda’s fish exports grew in value from $14.7 million to $87.5 
million. This growth had made fish exports the second largest source of export revenue (Uganda 
Export Promotion Board, 2005). Growth in fish exports has be so rapid that fish exports could 
likely overtake coffee as the country’s leading source of foreign exchange (Africa Online, 2004). 
  Although fish exports have grown quite significantly in the last decade, Uganda is 
dependent on the European Union (EU) for a significant percentage of export disappearance. In 
1996, EU countries imported 85 percent of Uganda’s exports of fresh and chilled fish products 
and 24 percent of all frozen fish products. Currently, the EU imports about 70 percent of all fish 
exports with Belgium and the Netherlands being the primary destinations (Dijkstra, 2001; 
Uganda Investment Authority, 2000).  
  For many African countries, geographic concentration of export trade can have dire 
economic and political consequences. Firstly, exports are more vulnerable to fluctuations in 
imports and the economic conditions of principle markets. Secondly, exports are particularly 
vulnerable to protectionist policies in these markets. Lastly, countries are vulnerable to political 
pressures and forced concessions on non-trade issues (Moss and Ravenhill, 1989). McGowan 
  2(1976) found evidence that African countries that export primarily to a single external market 
tend to manifest poorer economic performance overall than countries that have more diversified 
markets for their exports. Consequences of the EU dominating Ugandan fish trade occurred 
when the EU imposed successive import bans on Ugandan fish from February 1997 through June 
1998 and March 1999 through August 2000. Although these bans were primarily imposed due to 
food safety concerns, protecting domestic industries was also a factor. As a result, much of the 
capital in the fish exporting industry went unused causing both prices and industry output to 
decline, resulting in substantial economic decline in both the exporting and domestic industry 
(Marriott, Dillon and Hannah, 2004).  
In 2004, EU-15 member countries accounted for 9 of the top 15 importing countries of 
Ugandan fresh/chilled fish fillet. Total fresh/chilled fillet exports for that year were slightly over 
19 million kilograms valued at $70.4 million. Of these totals, EU countries accounted for 92 
percent of the total quantity and 89 percent of the total value. Belgium, France and the 
Netherlands alone accounted for over 70 percent of both quantity and value (Table 1). 
  [Insert Table 1 here]    
  The primary purpose of this paper is to measure the degree of monopsony power 
exercised by EU firms when importing fresh and chilled fish fillet from Uganda. Given that 
Belgium, France and the Netherlands account for most of the fish exported these are the 
countries considered in this study. The methodology used builds on the econometric method for 
determining oligopoly power introduced by Appelbaum (1982). This was extended to include 
buyer market power (oligopsony or monopsony power) by Schroeter (1988) and further 
developed by Murray (1995) and, Muth and Wohlgenant (1999). These studies focused on 
  3domestic industries where the primary objective was determining market power in material input 
markets and intermediate products. 
Given that the bulk of international trade consist of intermediate products in that 
processing is often required before reaching the final consumer, the above methods for 
determining monopsony power is applied to the fish importing industry in EU countries. 
Although fresh and chilled fish fillet arrive in final form there is enough domestic value added 
such as handling, insurance, transportation, storing and repackaging that these imports can be 
viewed as inputs or intermediate products. Burgess (1974), Kohli (1978) and Sanyal and Jones 
(1982) give a thorough discussion of traded goods as intermediate goods even is cases od little or 
no product transformation.  
 
2. Methodology 
Let the industry be comprised of N importing firms (indexed by j=1, 2,..., N) with each firm 
importing a country-specific commodity Q in its final form and then reselling Q domestically. 
Using labor, capital, and other resources these firms incur the cost of importing such as freight, 
insurance, transportation and storage. Given the behavior of these firms the quantity imported 
and output resold are identical and can be represented by the same variable. Note that this is 
similar to the fixed proportions technology assumption in Schroeter (1988). The inputs used to 
carry out the firm’s activities (labor, capital, etc.) are employed in variable proportions and add 
value to the imported product through the services carried out by the firm. For a fixed level of 
output each firm will minimize the cost of employing these “value added” inputs when 
importing. If these inputs are purchased in competitive resource markets, a system of value-
  4added factor demand equations for the j
th firm can be derived using Shephard’s lemma. The 
system of value-added factor demand equations are expressed generally is  
(, )
jj j CQ =∂ ∂ xw w .           ( 1 )  
(, )
jj CQw is the j
th firm’s value-added input cost function,  is the firm’s output (quantity 
imported) and w is the vector of value-added factor prices. 
j Q
  If firms are not price takers in import markets then each firm expects that total imports 
for the country and imports prices are affected to some degree by the amount of Q imported by 
the firm. Let the total amount of Q exported to the importing country and export price be 
represented by the following export supply function 
(,) x QQ P = Z              ( 2 )  
where is the export price and  is a vector of exogenous export supply determinants.  x P Z
 The problem for the j
th firm is to choose  such that profit is maximized. Given that the 
total imported by the firm and the firm’s output are identical, and given variable proportions 
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If the PMP is subject to equation (2) then () (
jj
xx PQ Q Q PQ ) ∂ ∂= ∂∂ ∂∂. Letting 
() (
jj QQQQ θ =∂ ∂ )
j  (the firm’ conjectural elasticity) and  () ( xx QPPQ ) ε = ∂∂  (the export 
supply elasticity), the first order necessary condition is  
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j θ is the percentage change in the total amount of a good imported into a country given a 
percentage change in the amount imported by a firm in that country. If a country’s total imports 
is unaffected by a change in what is imported by a firm then 
j θ = 0. For absolute monopsony 
power  and 
j QQ ≡
j θ = 1. Therefore for varying degrees of monopsony power 1>
j θ >0 and the 
appropriate test a test for competitive behavior is 
j θ = 0. 
Solving for 

















= .           ( 6 )  
In the absence of market power the importing firms selling price should equal the price paid to 
the exporter and the marginal cost of value-added inputs. Note that this is the case only when 
j θ ε =0.  
2.1 Industry  aggregation 
Given the difficulty in obtaining firm-level data, empirical analysis requires aggregation 
to the industry level. In order for equations (1), (3)-(5) to be considered on an aggregate industry 
level assumptions must be made about the cost function for value added inputs . 
According to Appelbaum (1981) a Gorman form cost function for a representative firm satisfies 
the conditions required for industry aggregation. If the cost function is of the following form 
( , )
jj CQw
(, ) ( ) (
jj j j CQ Q C G =+ ww) w ,  j = 1, 2, …, N         (7) 
  6Then firms have linear and parallel expansions paths, so that the marginal costs of value- added 
inputs are constant and equal across firms. Given this assumption, the industry demand for value 
added inputs is 
1
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Since  (, ) ( )
jj j CQ Q C ∂∂ = ww for all firms, the industry level counterpart to equation (5) is  
1 dx PP C
θ
ε
⎡⎤ =+ + ⎢⎥ ⎣⎦
w ( )
                                                
.
1           ( 9 )  
Equation (2), the export-supply equation, equation (8), the system of value-added factor demand 
equations and equation (9) provide a model that can be used to estimate monopsony price 
distortions. 
 
3.  Econometric specification and data 
Having outlined the theoretical framework an application to the EU fish importing industries is 
provided. As mentioned, the purpose of this study is to determine the degree of monopsony 
power exercised by EU countries when importing fresh and chilled fish fillet from Uganda. 
Given that EU countries represent a significant percentage of Ugandan fish it is expected that 
Ugandan exports prices are greatly influence by EU imports. 
To estimate the model, functional forms must be chosen for equations (2), (8) and (9) and 
a parameterization for the conjectural elasticity must be developed. Assuming only two value-
 
1 Appelbaum (1981), and Muth and Wohlgenant (1999) provide a detailed explanation on the 
relationship between 
j θ andθ , and the interpretation of θ  given the assumed behavior of firms. 
It can be shown that 1
j
j N θ θ = ∑ and if a Cournot import market is assumed then θ  is a 
measure of the Herfindahl index.  
  7added inputs labor and capital, the industry value-added input cost function in generalized 
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 Where the b’s are parameters to be estimated and  ik ki bb = for all i and k. Note that equation (10) 
is of Gorman form where 
1
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lemma the capital and labor demand equations are 
1
2 (( ) ) K KK LK L K K xbb w wQ b =+ +    (11) 
1
2 (( ) ) LL L L K K L xbb w wQ b =+ + L .   (12) 
The functional form for the first order condition equation (9) is 
1
2 1( 2 ( ) dx L L L L K L K K K K PP b w bw w b w
θ
ε




.   (13) 
For the export supply equation (equation (2)) assume the following functional form 
0 ln ln ln xi
i
Qb P b Z ε =+ + ∑    (14) 
Following Appelbaum (1981) and Schroeter (1988) the conjectural elasticity θ is approximated 
linearly as a function of the exogenous variables and a trend term to account for excluded 
variable, define under the following linear specification 
01 2 3 tK L ww θ θθ θ θ =+ + + .                         (15) 
3.1  Data and estimation 
Panel data is used to estimate the model. The time period is 1994-2004 and the countries 
are Belgium, France and the Netherlands. The Commodity Trade Statistics section of the United 
  8Nations provided Chilled fish fillet imports values and quantities. Per unit import values for the 
EU countries ($ per kilogram) were proxies for Uganda export prices (the price at which the EU 
countries pay Uganda for fish) and per unit export values were proxies for EU countries selling 
prices (the price at which the EU importing firms charge when reselling fish domestically or re-
exporting). Real interest rates were provided by the World Bank Development Indicators and 
represented the price of capital. For each EU country a national wage index was used for the 
price of labor and was obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
Due to limited data the labor and capital demand equations could not be estimated and 
only equations (13)-(15) are estimated. Substituting equation (15) into equation (13) and solving 
for the difference in the domestic selling price and the price paid for imports, the first order 
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The export supply equation with error is 
*'
01 2 3 4 ln ln it it it Belgium France it Qb P xb t b r u gb D b D ε µ =+ ++ + + +   ( 1 7 )  
where t is the trend term, rug is the real interest rate for Uganda,  is a dummy variable 
that is equal to 1 if exports are to Belgium and 0 otherwise.   is equal to 1 if exports are to 
France and 0 otherwise. Equations (16) and (17) are estimated jointly using maximum likelihood 
and country dummies are added to the first order condition, export supply equation and the 




  94. Empirical  results 
The results of the estimation of equations (16) and (17) are presented in Tables 2 and 3 
respectively. The R
2 for the estimation of the first order condition is 0.82.and all except three of 
the parameter estimates are significant by at least the 0.10 significance level. According to 
Schroeter (1988), the cost function is well behaved if bKK, bLK, and bLL are all significantly 
positive. Concavity is guaranteed if bLK is positive. From the results concavity holds, however 
the negative estimates for bKK and bLL suggest that the cost function is not well behave. Negative 
estimates for bKK and bLL may be due to the labor and capital demand equations not being 
estimated jointly with the equations (16) and (17).     
The R
2 for the export supply estimation is 0.69. The export supply elasticity (0.978) is 
positive as expected, however it is insignificant. The trend tern is significant (0.350) which 
indicates that given the other independent variables, exports to the EU countries have been 
increasing overtime. Also as expected the real interest rate in Uganda has a significant negative 
impact on the exports supply to the EU countries (-0.069). 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
[Insert Table 3 here]  
Table 4 presents the monopsony price distortion for Belgium, France and the Netherlands 
from 1994 through 2004. The significance of the price distortions indicate the presence of 
monopsony power, which suggest that the importing country has influence on the prices received 
by Ugandan exporters. For Belgium and the Netherlands the monopsony distortion is 
insignificant for all years indicating that Ugandan prices are not significantly marked down 
below the price that would prevail under a perfectly competitive import market. For the 
Netherlands most of the monopsony distortions are insignificant as well, however for the years 
  101996, 1999, 2002, 2003 and 2004 the monopsony distortions are actually negative which goes 
against theory and rational firm behavior (firm importing at an economic loss). Although a 
negative price distortion is against theory, this does suggest that for the Netherlands, importing a 
significant percentage of Ugandan fish has not resulted in monopsony price markdowns. 
 [Insert Table 4 here]  
5.  Summary and Conclusions 
The purpose of this paper was to measure the degree of monopsony power exercised by 
EU firms when importing fresh and chilled fish fillet from Uganda. Given that Belgium, France 
and the Netherlands account for over 70 percent of all chilled fish fillet exported from Uganda it 
is likely that export prices are marked downed due to possible monopsony power.  
 
Although France, Belgium and the Netherlands import a significant percentage of chilled 
fish fillet from Uganda, results suggest that no significant degree of monopsony power is 
exercised by any the EU countries. A possible explanation is that given the number of importing 
firms in a country monopsony power may not be realized unless some form of collusion is 
possible (tacit or otherwise). This suggests that if Ugandan firms export to a few countries the 
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World   $  70,397,185      19,137,737  100.00  100.00
Belgium
b      21,193,484        6,092,039  30.11  31.83
France       19,092,814       5,465,269  27.12  28.56
Netherlands       10,421,620        3,009,625  14.80  15.73
United States         4,741,809           822,187  6.74  4.30
Germany         4,730,778           968,312  6.72  5.06
Spain         4,441,554        1,174,437  6.31  6.14
Luxembourg         2,128,409           632,125  3.02  3.30
United Arab Emirates         1,710,604           487,187  2.43  2.55
Italy            806,346           184,031  1.15  0.96
Lebanon            361,340           111,460  0.51  0.58
Canada            265,496             36,101  0.38  0.19
United Kingdom              99,128             29,902  0.14  0.16
Singapore              86,978             17,570  0.12  0.09
Greece              60,848             17,398  0.09  0.09
Nigeria              51,130             15,375  0.07  0.08
Total EU        $ 62,974,981      17,573,138  89.46  91.82
   
a  Top 15 countries represent 99.7 percent and 99.6 percent of the total value and quantity 
respectively. 
b  EU(15) countries are italics. 
Source: United Nations Commodity Trade Statistical Data Base, 2005. 
  12Table 2 
Maximum Likelihood Estimation Results for First Order Condition 
 
Parameter Estimate  SE 
0 θ ε   0.044 0.294 
1 θ ε   0.293 0.150* 
2 θ ε   -0.025 0.009*** 
3 θ ε   0.031 0.010*** 
1 δ ε   -1.376 0.482*** 
2 δ ε   -0.744 0.505 
KK b   -3.295 0.460*** 
LK b   0.532 0.057*** 
LL b   -0.011 0.425 
B γ   5.024 0.333*** 
F γ   3.165 1.916** 
 
R
2 = 0.82 
 
*** Significant level = .01 
**   Significant level = .05 
*     Significant level = .10 
 
  13Table 3 
Maximum Likelihood Estimation Results for Export Supply Equation 
 
Parameter Estimate  SE 
0 b   11.724 1.250
 
*** 
ε   0.978 0.815 
1 b   0.350 0.090
 
*** 
2 b   -0.069 0.037
 
* 
3 b   -0.146 0.609
 





2 = 0.69 
 
*** Significant level = .01 
*     Significant level = .10 
 
  14Table 4 
Monopsony Price Distortion Estimates for Belgium, France and The Netherlands: 1994-2004 
 
  Belgium France  Netherlands 
Year  Estimate SE  Estimate SE  Estimate SE 
1994  -0.041 (0.462)  -0.188 (0.404)  -0.132 (0.423) 
1995  -0.092 (0.494)  -0.078 (0.476)  -0.436 (0.383) 
1996 -0.272  (0.387)  -0.402 (0.356)  -0.668 (0.321) 
1997  0.151 (0.430)  -0.017 (0.357)  -0.240 (0.322) 
1998  0.258 (0.456)  0.184 (0.396)  -0.104 (0.352) 
1999 0.166  (0.397)  0.255 (0.390)  -0.892 (0.346) 
2000  0.884 (0.633)  0.660 (0.495)  -0.191 (0.247) 
2001  1.032 (0.693)  0.803 (0.539)  -0.129 (0.256) 
2002 0.757  (0.566)  0.625 (0.463)  -0.563 (0.282) 
2003 0.196  (0.393)  0.261 (0.383)  -1.271 (0.515) 
2004 0.435  (0.415)  0.115 (0.361)  -1.524 (0.618) 
 
Bold Indicate Significance of at least 0.05. 
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